Debate, dawdle and delay
Europe lacks a policy compass – By Theo Sommer
The European Union is in a pitiable state. Its leaders are, in the words of the Financial Times, “economically out of their depth and politically driven by conflicting national dogmas and parochial vested interests.” No wonder that the 27 members are divided on almost everything.
They are split, first and foremost, over how to solve the eurozone debt crisis. Let Greece go bankrupt by restructuring? Reschedule or “re-profile” its debt? Hand over more bailout money? Let the careless investors bleed, or not? They debate, dawdle and delay.
Nor is there greater unanimity on a slew of important political questions. Take Libya. While Germany abstained on Resolution 1973, France and Britain, dragging in the United States, started the campaign against Muammar Gaddafi. The Americans quickly dumped the operation into NATO’s lap. Now the alliance, having exhausted the military possibilities circumscribed by the UN mandate is no closer to its political aim: the toppling of the desert despot. Egged on by France, some favor raising the stakes, extending the range of targets, intensifying the air strikes or even deploying boots on the ground. Others are dead-set against any of these measures, and still others dither or dissent. Europe is hardly speaking with one voice. The EU’s inconspicuous top team in Brussels lacks both presence and clout.
Then there is Afghanistan. In several capitals, one can hear the planning staff murmuring “mission accomplished” – with the execution of Osama bin Laden, September 11 has been avenged, al Qaeda beheaded; time to declare victory and withdraw. Others ponder the size and speed of troop reductions. Some are content to hang on despite the bleak prospects of ever establishing a stable democracy in Afghanistan.
Europeans are also at loggerheads over how to handle the Arab-Israeli conflict. Come September, when the Palestinians plan to proclaim a state of their own, London, for instance, might back calls for a UN vote recognizing the new entity. Berlin, however, rejects any unilateral proclamation of statehood.
And so on down the policy line. The Europeans keep urging much tighter coordination and consolidation of their defense and security assets. In practice, however, they pursue quite different concepts and projects. Thus the much-touted “European pillar” in NATO remains an elusive goal. Stalemate is the result.
Another bone of contention is the future of nuclear energy. After the shock of Fukushima, Chancellor Angela Merkel, making a U-turn in her nuclear policy, backs phasing out Germany’s 17 power stations by 2022; nearly half of them have already been shut down. Pro-nuclear France is upset. A few nations, following the German example, have begun an agonizing reappraisal of their own policy. Yet a number of others are bent on expanding their nuclear energy program.
European policy reflects all the virtues and, more especially, all the vices of a consensus-oriented community. Inevitably, this creates the impression that post-Lisbon Europe has an institutional voice but nothing to say. In the same vein, the domestic policies of the 27 EU countries reflect their national priorities, creating a patchwork quilt that does not reveal any plan or pattern. “Chacun pour soi,” as France’s Le Monde noted, has become the battle-cry of nations.
It should surprise no one that onerous budget deficits as well as the high expectations of voters cause Merkel, too, to attend to her own constituency. It is not populism but simple common sense for her to argue that the Germans, if they are to help the indebted European economies, expect those countries to put their houses in order. To label this “re-nationalization” is foolish. Merkel’s commitment to Europe and to the euro cannot be doubted, even if her tactics are not always plausible and her style of communicating is trite and uninspiring.
So what about German abstention on Libya in the UN Security Council? It was a grave mistake, made by a foreign minister lacking experience, gravitas, a sense of history and the kind of fingerspitzengefühl that marks the seasoned diplomat. Mastering contingencies is not Guido Westerwelle’s forte. But his decision did not justify the numerous critical commentaries in the foreign press that Germany was once again “going it alone” and dodging its wider responsibilities.
For proof of that, read the historic speech in which Defense Minister Thomas de Maizière outlined the future of the German armed forces. Yes, the Bundeswehr is going to be reduced to around 170,000 men and women. But it will be a leaner force than the present 225,000, capable of deploying 10,000 troops at a time instead of the 7,000 today.
“As a strong partner in a united Europe we want to serve the cause of peace in the world,” de Maizière said. His new Strategic Doctrine underlines that security can no longer be defined geographically, as developments outside the European area of security and stability can have an immediate impact on German security.
In recent months Germany has alternately been accused of imposing its will on Europe and failing to exert leadership, of being stingy and overbearing, brash and hesitant. Be this as it may – like all of its partners the Federal Republic is trying to adapt to the new realities of a globalized world. Its leaders know that a sonderweg would be pernicious. The success of Europe is still the hard core of Germany’s national interest.